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Applications and Real-Time Internet-Draft This document specifies an end-to-end authenticated encryption scheme for application objects transmitted via Media over QUIC (MoQ) Transport. The scheme enables original publishers that share a symmetric key with end subscribers, to ensuring that MoQ relays are unable to decrypt object contents. Additionally, subscribers can verify the integrity and authenticity of received objects, confirming that the content has not been modified in transit. Additionally it allows MoQ parameters to be protected so the publisher can select if they are readable and/or modifiable by relays. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Media over QUIC Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction Media Over QUIC Transport (MoQT) is a protocol that is optimized for the QUIC protocol, either directly or via WebTransport, for the dissemination of delivery of low latency media . MoQT defines a publish/subscribe media delivery layer across set of participating relays for supporting wide range of use-cases with different resiliency and latency (live, interactive) needs without compromising the scalability and cost effectiveness associated with content delivery networks. It supports sending media objects through sets of relays nodes. Typically a MOQ Relay doesn't need to access the media content, thus allowing the media to be "end-to-end" encrypted so that it cannot be decrypted by the relays. However for a relay to participate effectively in the media delivery, it needs to access naming information of a MoQT object to carryout the required store and forward functions. As such, two layers of security are required:

1. Hop-by-hop (HBH) security between two MoQT endpoints.
2. End-to-end (E2E) security from the Original Publisher of an MoQT object to End Subscribers

The HBH security is provided by TLS in the QUIC connection that MoQT runs over. MoQT support different E2EE protection as well as allowing for E2EE security. This document defines a scheme for E2E authenticated encryption of MoQT objects. This scheme is based on the SFrame mechanism for authenticated encryption of media objects . However, a secondary goal of this design is to minimize the amount of additional data the encryptions requires for each object. This is particularly important for very low bit rate audio applications where the encryption overhead can increase overall bandwidth usage by a significant percentage. To minimize the overhead added by end-to-end encryption, certain fields that would be redundant between MoQT and SFrame are not transmitted. The encryption mechanism defined in this specification can only be used in application context where object ID values are never more than 32 bits long. This limitation is described in .

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

E2EE:

End-to-End Encryption

HBH:

Hop-by-Hop

varint:

variable length integer (Section 1.4.1).

MoQT Object Model Recap MoQT defines a publish/subscribe based media delivery protocol, where in endpoints, called original publishers, publish objects which are delivered via participating relays to receiving endpoints, called end subscribers. Section 2 of defines hierarchical object model for application data, comprised of objects, groups and tracks. Objects defines the basic data element, an addressable unit whose payload is sequence of bytes. All objects belong to a group, indicating ordering and potential dependencies. A track contains has collection of groups and serves as the entity against which a subscribers issue subscription requests.

Structure of an MoQT session | | Group1 | | Group2 | ... | GroupN | | +----+----+ +----+----+ +---------+ | | | | | | | +----+----+ +----+----+ | | Object0 | | Object0 | | +---------+ +---------+ | | Object1 | | Object1 | | +---------+ +---------+ | | Object2 | | Object2 | | +---------+ +---------+ | ... | +---------+ | | ObjectN | | +---------+ | | time +-- TrackB --+---------+-----+---------+-------+---------+------> | Group1 | | Group2 | ... | GroupN | +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ | | | | | | +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ | Object0 | | Object0 | | Object0 | +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ ]]>

Objects are comprised of three parts: parts that Relays can read and modify, parts that Relay can read but is not allowed to modify, and parts the Relays cannot read or modify. The payload portion MAY be end to end encrypted, in which case it is only visible to the original publisher and the end subscribers. The application is solely responsible for the content of the object payload. Tracks are identified by a combination of its Track Namespace and Track Name. Tuples of the Track Namespace and Track Name are treated as a sequence of binary bytes. Groups and Objects are represented as variable length integers called GroupID and ObjectID respectively. Two important properties of objects are:

1. The combination of Track Namespace, Track Name, Group ID and Object ID are globally unique in a given relay network, referred to as Full Object ID in this specification.
2. The data inside an MoQT Object (and its size) can never change after the Object is first published. There can never be two Objects with the same Full Object ID but different data.

One of the ways system keep the Full Object IDs unique is by using a fully qualified domain names or UUIDs as part of the Track Namespace.

Secure Objects Section 10.2.1 defines fields of a canonical MoQT Object. The protection scheme defined in this draft encrypts the Object Payload and Encrypted Properties List . The scheme authenticates the Group ID, Object ID, Immutable Properties (Section 11.6 of ) and Object Payload fields, regardless of the on-the-wire encoding of the objects over QUIC Datagrams or QUIC streams. MoQ Object Security Protection Levels

Protection Level	Fields
Unprotected and Unauthenticated (HBH only)	Track Alias, Mutable Properties
End-to-End Authenticated	Group ID, Object ID, Publisher Priority, Immutable Properties, Track Namespace, Track Name (including Key ID)
End-to-End Encrypted and Authenticated	Original Payload, Encrypted Properties List

Properties MoQT defines mutable and immutable properties for objects. This specification uses MoQT immutable properties to convey end-to-end authenticated metadata and adds encrypted object properties (see ). The Encrypted Properties List is serialized and encrypted along with the Object payload, decrypted and deserialized by the receiver. This specification further defines the Secure Object Key ID property (see ), which is transmitted within the immutable properties.

Setup Assumptions The application assigns each track a set of (Key ID, track_base_key) tuples, where each track_base_key is known only to authorized original publishers and end subscribers for a given track. How these per-track secrets and their lifetimes are established is outside the scope of this specification. The application also defines which Key ID should be used for a given encryption operation. For decryption, the Key ID is obtained from the Secure Object Key ID property (that is contained within the immutable properties of the Object). The scope of a Key ID is the namespace so if two tracks inside the same namespace have different tracks_base_keys, then they need to have different Key ID values. This design is to support a single key across many tracks where a client uses subscribe namespace to get new tracks as they are created in the namespace. Applications determine the ciphersuite to be used for each track's encryption context. See for the list of ciphersuites that can be used.

Application Procedure This section provides steps for applications over MoQT to use mechanisms defined in this specification.

Serialized Full Track Name Serialized Full Track Name is composed of MoQT Track Namespace and Track Name as shown below: The Serialize operation follows the same on-the-wire encoding for Track Name Space and Track Name as defined in Section 2.4.1 of . This mandates that the serialization of Track Namespace tuples starts with varint encoded count of tuples. This is followed by encoding corresponding to each tuple. Each tuple's encoding starts with varint encoded length for the count of bytes and bytes representing the content of the tuple. The Track Name is varint encoded length followed by sequence of bytes that identifies an individual track within the namespace. The + represents concatenation of byte sequences.

Object Encryption To encrypt a MoQT Object, the application constructs a plaintext from the application data and any encrypted properties: Where original_payload is the application's object data. The serialization of original_payload consists of a varint-encoded byte count followed by the payload bytes. The serialization for the Encrypted Properties List follows the rules for immutable properties (as defined in Section 11 of ). The plaintext is then encrypted: The resulting ciphertext replaces the original_payload as the MoQT Object Payload. The ciphertext length reflects the encrypted original_payload plus any Encrypted Properties List plus the AEAD authentication tag. The detailed encryption process is shown below:

Object Encryption Process | Nonce Formation| | | | +----+-----------+ | | | | | | key nonce aad pt | | | | | v | | | +-------------+--------------+ | | | | | | | +--->+ AEAD.Encrypt +<----------------------+ | | |<------------------------------+ +-------------+--------------+ | v +-----+-----+ |Ciphertext | |(MoQT Obj | | Payload) | +-----------+ ]]>

Object Decryption To decrypt a MoQT Object, the application provides the MoQT Object Payload as ciphertext input to obtain the plaintext: The plaintext is then deserialized to extract the application's original_payload and the Encrypted Properties List:

1. Read a varint to obtain the original_payload length.
2. Read that many bytes as original_payload.
3. If no bytes remain, there is no Encrypted Properties List.
4. Otherwise, read the property type (16 bits). If the value is not 0xA, drop the object. Parse the remaining bytes as the Encrypted Properties List structure.

If parsing fails at any stage, the receiver MUST drop the MoQT Object. The detailed decryption process is shown below:

Object Decryption Process | Nonce Formation| | | | +----------------+ | | | | | | key nonce aad ct | | | | | v | | | +----------------------------+ | | | | | | | +--->| AEAD.Decrypt |<----------------------+ | | |<------------------------------+ +-------------+--------------+ | pt | v +----------+----------------+ | | v v +-------------------+ +-----------------+ | original_payload | | Private Header | | (application data)| | Extensions | +-------------------+ +-----------------+ ]]>

Encryption Schema MoQT secure object protection relies on an ciphersute to define the AEAD encryption algorithm and hash algorithm in use (). We will refer to the following aspects of the AEAD and the hash algorithm below:

• AEAD.Encrypt and AEAD.Decrypt - The encryption and decryption functions for the AEAD. We follow the convention of RFC 5116 and consider the authentication tag part of the ciphertext produced by AEAD.Encrypt (as opposed to a separate field as in SRTP ).
• AEAD.Nk - The size in bytes of a key for the encryption algorithm
• AEAD.Nn - The size in bytes of a nonce for the encryption algorithm
• AEAD.Nt - The overhead in bytes of the encryption algorithm (typically the size of a "tag" that is added to the plaintext)
• AEAD.Nka - For cipher suites using the compound AEAD described in (Section 4.5.1 of ), the size in bytes of a key for the underlying encryption algorithm
• Hash.Nh - The size in bytes of the output of the hash function

Metadata Authentication The Key ID, Full Track Name, Immutable Properties, Group ID, Object ID, and Publisher Priority for a given MoQT Object are authenticated as part of secure object encryption. This ensures, for example, that encrypted objects cannot be replayed across tracks and that the publisher's intended priority cannot be modified without detection. When protecting or unprotecting a secure object, the following data structure captures the input to the AEAD function's AAD argument: The Group ID and Object ID fields are encoded as 64-bit and 32-bit unsigned integers respectively in big-endian (network) byte order. This fixed-width encoding ensures that both sender and receiver construct identical AAD values without ambiguity, as variable-length integer encodings permit multiple valid representations of the same value. Serialized Immutable Properties MUST include the Secure Object Key ID property containing the Key ID. This serves as the semantic equivalent of the KID field in SFrame.

Nonce Formation The Group ID and Object ID for an object are used to form a 96-bit counter (CTR) value, which is XORed with a salt to form the nonce used in AEAD encryption. The counter value is formed by encoding the Group ID as a 64-bit big-endian unsigned integer, followed by the Object ID encoded as a 32-bit big-endian unsigned integer. This encryption/decryption will fail if applied to an object where group ID is larger than 2^64-1 or the object ID is larger than 2^32-1 and the MoQT Object MUST NOT be processed further. MOQT supports Object IDs larger than 32 bits. However, for common AEAD ciphers such as AES-GCM, performance is better when the nonce is 96 bits. For MOQT’s primary use cases, applications can typically design their track, group, and object structure so that Object IDs do not need to exceed 32 bits, making this a reasonable performance tradeoff. The Group ID and Object ID could both have been limited to, for example, 48 bits each. However, because 32 bit Object IDs were large enough for the identified use cases, the Object ID field was left at 32 bits.

Key and Salt Derivation Encryption and decryption use a key and salt derived from the track_base_key associated with a Key ID. Given a track_base_key value, the key and salt are derived using HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) as follows: In the derivation of moq_secret:

• The + operator represents concatenation of byte sequences.
• The Key ID value is encoded as an 8-byte big-endian integer.
• The cipher_suite value is a 2-byte big-endian integer representing the cipher suite in use (see ).

The hash function used for HKDF is determined by the cipher suite in use.

Encryption MoQT secure object encryption uses the AEAD encryption algorithm for the cipher suite in use. The key for the encryption is the moq_key derived from the track_base_key . The nonce is formed by first XORing the moq_salt with the current CTR value , and then encoding the result as a big-endian integer of length AEAD.Nn. The Encrypted Properties List and Object payload field from the MoQT object are used by the AEAD algorithm for the plaintext. The encryptor forms an SecObj header using the Key ID value provided. The encryption procedure is as follows:

1. Obtain the plaintext payload to encrypt from the MoQT object. Extract the Group ID, Object ID, and the Serialized Immutable Properties from the MoQT object headers. Ensure the Secure Object Key ID property is included, with the Key ID set as its value.
2. Retrieve the moq_key and moq_salt matching the Key ID.
3. Form the aad input as described in .
4. Form the nonce by as described in .
5. Apply the AEAD encryption function with moq_key, nonce, aad, MoQT Object payload and serialized Encrypted Properties List as inputs (see ).

The final SecureObject is formed from the MoQT transport headers, followed by the output of the encryption.

Decryption For decrypting, the Key ID from the Secure Object Key ID property contained within the immutable properties is used to find the right key and salt for the encrypted object. The MoQT track information matching the Key ID along with Group ID and Object ID fields of the MoQT object header are used to form the nonce. The decryption procedure is as follows:

1. Parse the SecureObject to obtain Key ID, the ciphertext corresponding to MoQT object payload and the Group ID and Object ID from the MoQT object headers.
2. Retrieve the moq_key, moq_salt and MoQT track information matching the Key ID.
3. Form the aad input as described in .
4. Form the nonce by as described in .
5. Apply the AEAD decryption function with moq_key, nonce, aad and ciphertext as inputs.
6. Decode the Encrypted Properties List, returning both the properties and the object payload.

If extracting Key ID fails either due to missing Secure Object Key ID property within immutable properties or error from parsing, the client MUST discard the received MoQT Object. If a ciphertext fails to decrypt because there is no key available for the Key ID value presented, the client MAY buffer the ciphertext and retry decryption once a key with that Key ID is received. If a ciphertext fails to decrypt for any other reason, the client MUST discard the ciphertext. Invalid ciphertexts SHOULD be discarded in a way that is indistinguishable (to an external observer) from having processed a valid ciphertext. In other words, the decryption operation should take the same amount of time regardless of whether decryption succeeds or fails.

Object Properties

Key ID Property Key ID (Property Type 0x2) is a variable length integer and identifies the keying material (keys, nonces and associated context for the MoQT Track) to be used for a given MoQT track. The Key ID property is included within the Immutable Properties. All objects encoded MUST include the Key ID property when using this specification for object encryption.

Encrypted Properties List The Encrypted Properties List (Property Type 0xA) is a container that holds a sequence of Key-Value-Pairs (see Section 1.4.3 of ) representing one or more Object Properties. These properties can be added by the Original Publisher and are encrypted along with the Object Payload, making them accessible only to End Subscribers.

Padding Property The Padding Property (Property Type 0x32) allows the Original Publisher to pad the encrypted payload to obscure the actual size of the object payload, helping mitigate traffic analysis attacks. Unlike other properties where the Length field uses the MOQ variable- length integer encoding, the Padding Property always encodes its Length as a 2-byte (16-bit) unsigned integer in network byte order. This fixed- size encoding simplifies computing the amount of padding to add. The Padding field contains Length bytes, all of which SHOULD be set to zero (0x00). Receivers MUST ignore the contents of the Padding field. This property is included within the Encrypted Properties List, ensuring that the padding bytes are encrypted along with the object payload and other encrypted properties. The Padding Property MUST be the last property in the Encrypted Properties List if present.

Processing To add padding, the publisher:

1. Determines the desired padding size based on its traffic analysis threat model.
2. Encodes the padding length as a 4-byte unsigned integer in network byte order.
3. Appends that many zero bytes as the Padding field.

To skip padding, the receiver:

1. Reads the 1-byte type field (0x32).
2. Reads the next 4 bytes as the padding length.
3. Skips the indicated number of bytes to reach the payload or next property.

Usage Considerations To implement the protection mechanisms specified herein, a secure object requires the complete object before any validity checks can be performed. This introduces latency proportional to the object size; if the application aggregates excessive data into a single object (e.g., encapsulating 6 seconds of video), the entire segment must be received before processing or validation can commence, delaying access to all contained data until transfer completion. This specification does not provide security for Track Properties. If an application needs end-to-end authentication for track associated data, the application SHOULD send that data in the Immutable Properties of the first object in each group.

Security Considerations

Threat Model MoQT Objects are published by Original Publishers and delivered to End Subscribers, potentially through one or more Relays. Each MoQT connection is protected hop-by-hop using TLS. Security on cross Relay links is outside the scope of MoQT, but this specification assumes protection equivalent to TLS on those links. Because security is hop-by-hop, each Relay terminates a security association and can observe, modify, drop, delay, reorder, or replay MoQT data. Some message fields are expected to be modified by Relays during normal operation, while other fields are expected to be visible but immutable. See for details. This specification assumes that the Original Publisher and End Subscriber share one or more symmetric keys per Track, each identified by a Key ID. Key distribution and key negotiation are out of scope for this document (e.g., MLS could be used). In MoQT, sending multiple Objects with the same Track, Group ID, and Object ID but different values is a Malformed Track Error. This specification therefore assumes the Original Publisher does not publish modified versions of the same Object. This specification enables an End Subscriber to:

1. detect Relay modification of an Object's Original Payload, Encrypted Properties, Immutable Properties, Publisher Priority, Group ID, or Object ID;
2. detect delivery of an Object under the wrong Track Name or with a modified Key ID;
3. verify that the Original Payload and Encrypted Properties remained confidential from Relays; and
4. detect some (but not all) Object drops or replays in limited cases (see ).

This specification does not enable an End Subscriber to reliably detect:

• complete suppression of all Objects by a Relay;
• Relay-induced delay or reordering of Objects.

Fan Out Attacks Further complexity in the threat model arises from Relay fan out. A Relay network can forward Objects on a given Track to many downstream End Subscribers. In high rate applications such as video, the number of Objects delivered per second can be large, and the number of downscale subscribers can be large. A malicious Relay can exploit this scale by attempting different forgeries for different downstream End Subscribers on a subset of Objects. In some applications, a Relay could send a forged packet using a trial key. If the forgery was accepted, the forged packet would cause the End Subscriber to take an action observable by the Relay, such as closing the connection. This would allow the Relay to determine that the forgery succeeded, and therefore learn that the trial key was valid for the Track. This type of attack should be considered when selecting an appropriate cryptographic key length for an application. If an applications can fan out to 2^x clients and send 2^y message over a reasonable time period, a key roughly (x+y) bits longer SHOULD be used. One possible mitigation is for the application to track a metric of the rate of authentication failures across all End Subscribers for each Track.

Cryptographic Design The cryptographic computations described in this document are exactly those performed in the SFrame encryption scheme defined in , The scheme in this document is effectively a "virtualized" version of SFrame:

• The CTR value used in nonce formation is not carried in the object payload, but instead synthesized from the GroupID and ObjectID.
• The AAD for the AEAD operation is not sent on the wire (as with the SFrame Header), but constructed locally by the encrypting and decrypting endpoints.
• The format of the AAD is different but contains the same semantic information:
  • The Group ID and Object ID are combined to form what is the CTR in SFrame.
  • The Key ID (KID) is contained in the Serialized Immutable Properties rather than a separate header field.
  • The SFrame Header is constructed using MoQT-style varints, instead of the variable-length integer scheme defined in SFrame.
• The metadata input in to SFrame operations is defined to be the FullTrackName value for the object.
• The labels used in key derivation reflect MOQ usage, not generic SFrame.

The security considerations discussed in the SFrame specification thus also apply here. The SFrame specification lists several things that an application needs to account for in order to use SFrame securely, which are all accounted for here:

1. Header value uniqueness: Uniqueness of CTR values follows from the uniqueness of MoQT (GroupID, ObjectID) pairs. We only use one Key ID value, but instead use distinct SFrame contexts with distinct keys per track. This assures that the same (track_base_key, Key ID, CTR) tuple is never used twice.
2. Key management: We delegate this to the MoQT application, with subject to the assumptions described in .
3. Anti-replay: Replay is not possible within the MoQT framework because of the uniqueness constraints on ObjectIDs and objects, and because the group ID and object ID are cryptographically bound to the secure object payload.
4. Metadata: The analogue of the SFrame metadata input is defined in .

Any of the ciphersuites defined in registry can be used to protect MoQT objects. The caution against short tags in still applies here, but the MoQT environment provides some safeguards that make it safer to use short tags, namely:

• MoQT has hop-by-hop protections provided by the underlying QUIC layer, so a brute-force attack could only be mounted by a relay.
• In some usecases MoQT tracks have predictable object arrival rates, so a receiver can interpret a large deviation from this rate as a sign of an attack.
• The binding of the secure object payload to other MoQT parameters (as metadata), together with MoQT's uniqueness properties ensure that a valid secure object payload cannot be replayed in a different context.

AEAD Invocation Limits AEAD algorithms have limits on how many times a single key can be used before the cryptographic guarantees begin to degrade. Exceeding these limits can compromise confidentiality (allowing an attacker to distinguish encrypted content from random data) or integrity (allowing an attacker to forge valid ciphertexts). The severity of these risks depends on the specific algorithm in use. Implementations MUST track the number of encryption and decryption operations performed with each moq_key and ensure that these counts remain within the limits specified in for the cipher suite in use. When approaching these limits, implementations MUST arrange for new keying material to be established (e.g., by rotating to a new Key ID with a fresh track_base_key) before the limits are exceeded. For the AES-GCM cipher suites defined in this document, the primary concern is the confidentiality limit, which restricts the number of encryptions performed with a single key. For AES-CTR-HMAC cipher suites, both encryption and decryption operations count toward the applicable limits.

Detecting Deletion by Malicious Relays A malicious relay could selectively delete objects or groups before forwarding them to subscribers. While this specification does not mandate detection of such deletions, it does provide mechanisms that applications can use to detect when content has been removed. Some applications may not require deletion detection, or may be able to detect missing data based on the internal structure of the object payload (e.g., sequence numbers embedded in the media format). For applications that do require deletion detection at the MoQT layer, the following approaches are available:

Monotonically Incrementing Identifiers Applications that assign Group IDs and Object IDs in a strictly monotonic sequence (incrementing by 1 for each successive group or object) can straightforwardly detect gaps. A subscriber receiving Group ID N followed by Group ID N+2, or Object ID M followed by Object ID M+3, can conclude that intervening content was not delivered.

Non-Sequential Identifiers with Gap Properties Applications that use Group IDs or Object IDs with intentional gaps (e.g., for sparse data or timestamp-based identifiers) MUST include the Prior Group ID Gap and/or Prior Object ID Gap properties as immutable properties. These properties indicate the expected distance to the next identifier. If the Prior Object ID Gap property is absent from a secure object, receivers MUST assume a gap value of 1. Similarly, if the Prior Group ID Gap property is absent, receivers MUST assume a gap value of 1.

Signaling End of Content For applications that need to reliably detect lost objects at the end of a subgroup, group, or track, it is RECOMMENDED to signal completion using object status values defined in . By explicitly marking the final object in a sequence, subscribers can distinguish between "more objects may arrive" and "all objects have been sent," enabling detection of trailing deletions that would otherwise be undetectable. Publishers SHOULD send an End of Group status (0x3) as the final object in each group. This allows subscribers to determine whether all objects up to that Object ID have been received, enabling detection of any missing objects at the end of the group. Publishers SHOULD send an End of Track status (0x4) when the track is complete (e.g., end of a recorded stream or live session). This allows subscribers to determine whether all objects up to that location have been received, enabling detection of any missing objects at the end of the track. For subgroup boundaries, the transport stream closure (FIN) signals that all objects in the subgroup have been delivered.

IANA Considerations

MOQ Object Properties Registry This document defines new MoQT Object properties under the MOQ Object Properties registry.

Type	Value
0x2	Secure Object Key ID - see
0xA	Encrypted Properties List - see
0x32	Padding - see

Note: The Encrypted Properties List type (0xA) appears only within the encrypted payload structure defined in , not as a regular MoQT Object Property. It is registered here to reserve the type value and prevent conflicts with the property type field used in the encrypted payload format.

Cipher Suites This document establishes a "MoQ Secure Objects Cipher Suites" registry. Each cipher suite specifies an AEAD encryption algorithm and a hash algorithm used for key derivation. The following values are defined for each cipher suite:

• Nh: The size in bytes of the hash function output
• Nka: The size in bytes of the encryption key for the underlying cipher (CTR suites only)
• Nk: The size in bytes of the AEAD key
• Nn: The size in bytes of the AEAD nonce
• Nt: The size in bytes of the AEAD authentication tag

Value	Name	R	Nh	Nka	Nk	Nn	Nt
0x0000	Reserved	-
0x0001	AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_80	Y	32	16	48	12	10
0x0002	AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_64	Y	32	16	48	12	8
0x0003	AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_32	N	32	16	48	12	4
0x0004	AES_128_GCM_SHA256_128	Y	32	n/a	16	12	16
0x0005	AES_256_GCM_SHA512_128	Y	64	n/a	32	12	16
0xF000-0xFFFF	Reserved for private use	-

The "R" column indicates whether the cipher suite is Recommended:

• Y: Indicates that the IETF has consensus that the item is RECOMMENDED. Requires Standard Action as defined .
• N: Indicates the IETF has made no statement about the suitability of the associated mechanism. Requires First Come First Serve as defined in .
• D: Indicates that the item is discouraged and SHOULD NOT be used. Requires Standard Action or IESG Approval as defined in .

Cipher suite values are 2-byte big-endian integers. The algorithms are the same as defined in SFrame ciphersuites defined in the IANA SFrame Cipher Suites -registry . AES-GCM cipher suites (0x0004, 0x0005) use AES-GCM for authenticated encryption with a full 128-bit authentication tag. AES-CTR-HMAC cipher suites (0x0001, 0x0002, 0x0003) use AES in counter mode combined with HMAC for authentication in an encrypt-then-MAC construction. These suites support truncated authentication tags, providing lower overhead at the cost of reduced forgery resistance. Implementations MUST support AES_128_GCM_SHA256_128 (0x0004). Implementations SHOULD support AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_80 (0x0001).

References Normative References Cisco Google Google Meta This document defines Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT), a publish/ subscribe protocol that runs over QUIC and WebTransport. MOQT leverages the features of these transports, such as streams, datagrams, priorities, and partial reliability. MOQT operates both point-to-point and through intermediate relays, enabling scalable low-latency delivery. Despite its name, MOQT is media agnostic and can be used for a wide range of use cases. This document describes the Secure Frame (SFrame) end-to-end encryption and authentication mechanism for media frames in a multiparty conference call, in which central media servers (Selective Forwarding Units or SFUs) can access the media metadata needed to make forwarding decisions without having access to the actual media. This mechanism differs from the Secure Real-Time Protocol (SRTP) in that it is independent of RTP (thus compatible with non-RTP media transport) and can be applied to whole media frames in order to be more bandwidth efficient. IBM Research Europe - Zurich Mozilla Cloudflare An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm provides confidentiality and integrity. Excessive use of the same key can give an attacker advantages in breaking these properties. This document provides simple guidance for users of common AEAD functions about how to limit the use of keys in order to bound the advantage given to an attacker. It considers limits in both single- and multi-key settings. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document defines algorithms for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), and defines a uniform interface and a registry for such algorithms. The interface and registry can be used as an application-independent set of cryptoalgorithm suites. This approach provides advantages in efficiency and security, and promotes the reuse of crypto implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. Informative References IANA This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Acknowledgements Thanks to Alan Frindell for providing text on adding encrypted properties. Thank you to Magnus Westerlund for doing a thorough security review.

Test Vectors This appendix provides test vectors for verifying implementations of the MOQ Secure Objects encryption scheme. The vectors are presented in JSON format with hex-encoded byte strings and integer numeric values. Whitespace in the JSON is not significant. These vectors are deterministic and can be reproduced from the reference implementation by running cargo run --bin generate-test-vectors. The JSON structure has four top-level keys corresponding to four test categories:

Full Track Name Serialization Each entry tests serialization of Track Namespace tuples and Track Name into the Serialized Full Track Name byte string.

Key Derivation Each entry tests HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand for deriving moq_key and moq_salt from the track_base_key. The track_base_key values are ASCII strings: "sixteen byte key" (16 bytes) for SHA-256 suites and "a]256-bit-base-key-for-test!!!!!" (32 bytes) for SHA-512 suites. Intermediate values (moq_secret, moq_key_label, moq_salt_label) are included to aid debugging.

Nonce and AAD Formation Each entry tests CTR construction from Group ID and Object ID, nonce formation by XOR with salt, and SECURE_OBJECT_AAD serialization. All entries use AES_128_GCM_SHA256_128 (cipher suite 0x0004) with Key ID 7.

Full Encryption Each entry tests the complete encryption pipeline including key derivation, nonce formation, AAD construction, and AEAD encryption. The plaintext field shows the serialized input to AEAD: varint(payload_len) || payload || encrypted_properties_list. All entries include both immutable properties (which affect the AAD) and encrypted properties (which are encrypted with the payload). Common inputs (ASCII values shown for readability):

• track_base_key: "sixteen byte key" (16B) or "a]256-bit-base-key-for-test!!!!!" (32B)
• original_payload: "hello from moq"
• immutable_properties: property type 0x0004, value "relay-ok"
• encrypted_properties_list: property type 0x0100, value "for-eyes-only"